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President: Mr. Sirous Nasseri (Islamic Republic of Iran)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 690th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

On behalf of the Conference, and on my own behalf, I should like to extend a warm welcome to our distinguished guest speakers today: the foreign ministers of Slovenia, Slovakia and the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. It is a pleasure and honour to have them with us today and their presence testifies to the abiding interest of their Governments in our work and to the importance they attach to the multilateral approach to arms limitation and disarmament. I am sure we are all looking forward to hearing their statements.

I also have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Netherlands, Sweden, Pakistan, Brazil and the chairmen of the four ad hoc committees as well as the representative of India.

I should now like to give the floor to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovenia, Mr. Lojze Peterle.

Mr. PETERLE (Slovenia): Mr. President, at the end of the third session of the Conference, allow me to wish you every success in concluding this year's work of the Conference on Disarmament and to express my thanks to you as well as to previous chairmen for successful leadership of the Conference. I believe that also in this year the Conference will show positive results, significant for disarmament process in the world.

Before tackling specific questions dealt with at the Conference, may I present some views on current issues concerning security and disarmament?

The profound changes following the cold war have created a new political, economic and security image of Europe and the world. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the establishment and emancipation of new, democratically oriented States require a different way of cooperation and integration to the one pursued so far. This is particularly crucial since the changes have led to the emergence of new hotbeds of crisis and instability, which could also represent a threat to security in so far stable areas in Europe and in the world.

Following the bipolar way of thinking and settling security issues - which had seemed to be under control to a certain extent - the world now has to face new challenges and new demands to which it is still in search of suitable answers and solutions. It is a fact that the period of bipolarity was a relatively short phase of special relations in the world and that the world is now moving towards democratic processes of a new quality. For this reason, the relation between international security and disarmament has become more complex than hitherto.

Within this process, the situation of the countries in transition is particularly sensitive since their position is undefined in terms of security. In the newly created circumstances, appropriate security status should be ensured for these countries as soon as possible and an active approach

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towards this issue should be taken. The continued treatment in bipolar terms of countries in transition considerably impedes the process of their transition and integration into Europe.

We consider that one of the right ways of settling these controversies is cooperation within the Partnership for Peace offered by NATO. For this reason, the Republic of Slovenia supports the new role of NATO in Europe which builds bridges and not blockades and trenches. This provides a good example of successful adaptation to new circumstances, which creates favourable conditions for the development of democracy and stability in Europe.

Regrettably, the international community and international organizations have not conformed to the new circumstances. I believe that it will be necessary to thoroughly examine the utility of all parameters of security and disarmament, mainly deriving from the past, and their conformity with the new era, i.e. the era of transition and integration of the European continent.

The Republic of Slovenia opted for independence with the very vision of joining Europe, democracy and the market economy. These were fundamental aspirations which dictated the changes. In the former State we were faced with different views, with the undemocratic solving of problems, and with the imposition of the rights of the more powerful.

This we could not accept. We are, therefore, all the more astonished at the position of some States from the group of democratic and economically developed countries which aggravate, limit or even prevent our integration into Europe. Those who still insist on the way of thinking based on politically divided Europe and on the logic of power must become aware that problems cannot be solved in this way, but are instead perpetuated or even aggravated.

One of the consequences of such thinking which directly refers to Slovenia is the fact that Slovenia, a democratic and stable country, is still under an embargo on imports of arms and military equipment. Slovenia is thus politically discriminated against. With this measure its sovereignty and the right to defence have been directly limited. The embargo has a direct negative impact on economic growth since it degrades our rating on international financial markets and ranks us amongst potentially risky countries.

We wish to cooperate and to actively contribute to the consolidation of peace, security and stability in the world, in Europe and in particular in the region in which we are situated. We are, therefore, willing to participate in regional negotiations on disarmament. It is precisely in regional forms of disarmament that we envisage the strengthening and intensification of a global disarmament process and the enhancement of good-neighbourly relations and mutual trust.

Slovenia is particularly interested in regional security in its vicinity, i.e. in south-east Europe. It wishes to cooperate in this process only on an

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equal footing with all other countries in the region. The proposals to define the area of the so-called former Yugoslavia as a region to be disarmed in accordance with stricter criteria than apply to other countries are not acceptable to us. In no way can this territory be considered as a region. Regional security should be defined in harmony with the present time, on the basis of criteria including internationally recognized and sovereign States, legitimacy of security interest of all States, the principle of free will and the consent of all States interested. Regional disarmament should, however, not serve as a political instrument, based on the outdated perception of blocs in confrontation, making attempts at re-establishing States into historically decayed formations.

With regard to one of the currently most pressing issues in the sphere of disarmament, traditionally dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament - i.e. nuclear weapons - I should like to point out that Slovenia supports the extension of the validity of the non-proliferation Treaty. Since this is one of the most important agreements for international security and stability, we consider that it should be extended for an indefinite period of time without imposing any conditions. Slovenia has already communicated its standpoint to the depositaries of the agreement.

We believe that a successful movement towards the conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and the conclusion of the agreement on negative security assurances by all nuclear super-Powers would have a significant influence on the general attitude of States concerning the extension of the validity of the non-proliferation Treaty.

As in other areas of security and disarmament, we must recognize that, along with development of new technologies, there has been a marked increase in the number of countries potentially in possession of nuclear weapons or the technology for their manufacture. This encourages the uncontrollable spread of nuclear substances, thus resulting in an increased number of cases of unlawful trade in radioactive substances. One may therefore justifiably ask: What nuclear security do we have in Europe and in the world? A positive answer to this question is possible only after universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty has been achieved and when the international community starts to implement strict measures for the effective prevention of unlawful trafficking and smuggling of radioactive substances and technologies.

As a State in the territory of which a nuclear power station has been operating, it is in Slovenia's vital interest to ensure the security of nuclear devices. Efficient implementation of the international control regime should be applied thus preventing their misuse for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons and unlawful trafficking in radioactive substances.

In conclusion, I would like to express my support for the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, which would more appropriately reflect the changes and a new security situation in the world which I have briefly mentioned. We believe that the right solution to this

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issue would be the inclusion of all interested peaceful States capable of contributing to the successful work of the Conference as fully-fledged members in the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Foreign Minister Peterle for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, Mr. Eduard Kukan.

Mr. KUKAN (Slovakia): Mr. President, let me first use this opportunity to express my conviction of the crucial significance of the successful course of the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament. I am firmly confident that your abilities as well as your experience will in a considerable way contribute to the work of this Conference. At the same time, I would like to assure you of the full support of the Slovak delegation.

Having in mind the striving for global disarmament, I am deeply convinced that the present time is of key importance for us. Today, we see possibilities which even the greatest optimists could not foresee a few years ago. Thus the Slovak society, like other peaceful nations committed to the peaceful heritage of its preceding generations, confirms its readiness to contribute to the removal of tension caused by the enormous accumulation of arms, residues of the cold war.

The comprehensive test-ban treaty belongs without any doubt to the most significant issues discussed in the framework of this Conference. The present favourable political situation offers a great opportunity not only to reduce the existing nuclear potential, but to undertake all the necessary measures to curb its further development as well. It would be an unjustifiable mistake to miss this great chance. Being aware of the urgency of the problem and exceptionality of this moment, the Slovak Republic supports the early conclusion of an efficient treaty. We are interested in reaching such a treaty which would ban all nuclear explosions without any exception and forever. Simultaneously, we would wish this treaty to enter into force as early as possible. Moreover, it would be appropriate to provide for the indefinite validity of the treaty.

We consider the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the most important instrument in the nuclear non-proliferation area. The Slovak Republic wishes to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation system by promoting the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and by extending it indefinitely and unconditionally. So, we fully support the striving of the European Union reflected in the recently adopted decision on joint action regarding preparations for the 1995 NPT review and extension Conference. Strengthening of the regime which prevents proliferation of this kind of weaponry is a significant step towards complete nuclear disarmament. Especially, the non-nuclear-weapon States feel threatened by the existence of nuclear weapons. In addition, it is worth being worried about the fact that the nuclear-weapon States have not excluded the possible use of these weapons yet. So it is quite understandable that the Slovak Republic invites the nuclear Powers to commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Moreover, we believe that they will follow the

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countries which have already shown their historic wisdom by giving up their right to own nuclear weapons. The legal commitment of the nuclear-weapon States would be the first and the easiest step towards fulfilment of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

The production of fissile material for weapons and other explosive devices is an inseparable part and parcel of the complex problems concerning nuclear weapons. The Slovak Republic therefore welcomed the preparatory consultations on this issue at the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that experts and diplomats will be able to convene the first round of negotiations and bring them to a successful conclusion of the Treaty. Here, I would like to underscore that, from our point of view, even a partial success is better than none. This is the reason why we support an immediate commencement of the negotiations on the basis of the so-called simple mandate determined by United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L.

We share the view that, in order to achieve exclusively peaceful exploration of outer space, the present legal mechanism should be strengthened so that it corresponds with up-to-date technical progress and bans sending into outer space not only conventional arms, but laser, high-frequency and anti-satellite weapons as well. There is a lot of work to be done in this area. Though the existing space treaties represent positive steps in the right direction, more must be done to achieve the ultimate goal. The time has come to estimate the possibility of concluding a comprehensive multilateral agreement banning deployment of weapons in outer space and creating a supranational body to supervise its observation. We support the elaboration of a politically binding document that would have as a temporary measure the form of a code of conduct in outer space, and would cover exchanges of information concerning the space activities.

Considering transparency in armaments, the Slovak Republic has welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as a significant measure to solve the problem of excessive and destabilizing transfers of conventional arms. At the same time, we realize that its full effectiveness will be safeguarded only by universal participation. We consider regional measures as a suitable supplementary element to the United Nations Register.

The Slovak Republic takes an active part in the negotiations on disarmament, cooperation and security in Europe. Signing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the 1992 Vienna Document and the open skies Treaty, Slovakia joined the process of transparency in armaments, arms control and disarmament. However, we do not consider the status achieved to be final and we support elaboration of an international code on conventional arms transfers.

The Slovak Republic is ready to take part in an exchange of information on the organizational structure and size of armed forces. Within the framework of CSCE we are committed to and we do provide information on medium-term and long-term plans concerning the size, structure, training and armaments of our armed forces.

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Concerning the proposal on extending the United Nations Register to the category of weapons of mass destruction and the production, possession and transfer of weapons of mass destruction, in our opinion, these aspects have already been subjects of regulation in other international agreements and documents. Their inclusion in the United Nations Register should therefore be reconsidered.

On the territory of the Slovak Republic there are no chemical weapons deployed, developed or produced and we have no intention to develop, produce or obtain them by any other means at all. There is national legislation being prepared for adoption to ban chemical arms, so that it, together with the ratification of the CWC, will create legislative conditions in the Slovak Republic for fulfilment of the Convention commitments.

The facts mentioned above demonstrate that the Slovak Republic is deeply interested in being perceived as a reliable member of international society. The Slovak authorities undertook concrete steps to contribute to stability and security in our region. The Slovak Republic has been a sovereign State since 1 January 1993, and during its short existence it has built up a transparent and effective control mechanism of trade in weapons and military technologies. According to resolution 46/34 L of the United Nations General Assembly, Slovakia passes annual reports to the Register of Conventional Arms.

The Slovak Republic supports on principle all disarmament activities and realizes the extraordinary importance of the Conference on Disarmament as a central multilateral forum for negotiations on arms control and disarmament. It is deplorable that, despite recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary-General as well, the task of extending the Conference on Disarmament's membership has become a latent issue. Mentioning this is especially bitter for us since the Slovak Republic wants to take a full-rights part in activities of the Conference in terms of her succession to the former Czechoslovak Republic, which was one of the founding members of the CD. Moreover, the Slovak Republic belongs to the reliable contributors to conventional disarmament. It is really a paradox that even though the Slovak defence industry has decreased its production to the level of 9 per cent in comparison with the year 1988, we have not achieved fully-fledged membership in the Conference so far. We are confident that concrete facts, deeds and figures should play the decisive role in considering the membership issue.

Finally, I would like to ask you to solve the membership issue in the shortest possible time, so that the composition of the Conference on Disarmament reflects the present geopolitical situation more consistently and answers the requirements of arms control and disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Minister Kukan for his statement and also for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is Foreign Minister Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, who is attending this Conference for the tenth time and as such, I believe, is not only a familiar personality to the Chair, but also to the Conference as a whole. I now invite Dr. Velayati to address the Conference.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran) (translated from Farsi): My country has a deep interest in the issues that this Conference deals with and, therefore, we endeavour to follow the debates and negotiations at this forum with intensity and care. The outcome of the work here and in other disarmament settings has major implications at both global and regional levels. As such they are of great significance and relevance for us.

It is, therefore, a pleasure for me to be back here and to address the Conference on Disarmament. But let me first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the work of the Conference. It is interesting to see a fellow diplomat and a colleague in this position. I am aware that this is a crucial time for the Conference as it tries to wind up its work for 1994. I hope that you will succeed.

I wish also to congratulate deeply Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, a friend whom I have been acquainted with for years, and Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, a familiar personality whose unreserved and devoted service to this Conference goes back many years, on their appointments as Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference.

For more than four decades, the predominance of the cold war over world politics affected international relations in many respects. It divided most of the industrial world into two adversary blocs, each led by a super-Power, and directed vast economic and human resources towards military ends. Competition for influence in other parts of the world was heightened mainly through manipulation of ethnic or national tensions. Outside involvements tended to aggravate regional conflicts, through provision of military means to the adversaries. Therefore, the confrontational nature of relations between the two blocs was extended to other States across the globe.

Patterns of international politics have begun to change slowly since then. In Europe, the main arena of the cold war, the division has been terminated and confrontation has begun to give way to cooperation. NATO and Warsaw have subsequently declared a new partnership within the European continent. The new commitment to dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defensive capability as the three mutually reinforcing elements of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council should presumably pave the way for a Europe devoid of confrontation and conflict.

Yet the high expectations and enthusiasm that emerged after the end of the cold war have gradually been tainted and tamed. Even in Europe itself, where age-old disputes were long contained through freezing of the territorial status quo within the framework of the Helsinki Declaration, the risks violence and war have been on the rise. Europe has now witnessed long and devastating wars right at its doorstep, without having the ability, or the will, to resolve them. Potentials for conflict are still prevalent in various forms and competition, in many instances, reaches the borders of confrontation.

The same is true of other areas of the world; whereas amelioration of international relations, as a whole, has had its positive effects, the

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tendency towards instability, insecurity and conflict has also grown in parallel. Many new conflicts have emerged some with no solution in reach. Hotbeds of tension are found everywhere. Arms build-ups, in most situations, are on the increase rather than decrease. More economic resources are still diverted towards armaments. We see, as a result, a world that continues to be devastated by hostility and war.

Various factors, understandably overlooked in the optimistic euphoria which surrounded the jubilant termination of the cold war, have been cited for this situation. There remains, nevertheless, one fundamental underlying cause which needs to be addressed, and addressed soon, if we are to anticipate a real change in the world situation.

Security, for decades now, has been perceived to be attainable only on the basis of "deterrence", a "balance of power" or, more properly said, a "balance of terror"; a perception initially persistent amongst the major Powers which subsequently spread into other parts of the world. All military strategies and approaches to armaments have long been based on this perception. It is evident that any real change in international relations demands, as a prerequisite, a change in such concepts. But the military doctrines that have prevailed for so long now have proved very much resistant to such change.

The problem is that as long as security and military doctrines are defined on the basis of rivalry, hostility and a constant appetite for confrontation, when foe becomes friend, new enemies must be sought. I believe, in examining the trends that have succeeded the cold war, one can clearly detect a redirection of that inherent hostility towards the developing countries. Hence, the dictum that East-West rivalry has been transformed into North-South confrontation is appearing more and more frequently in the political literature.

Arguments have been raised, depicting this as exaggerated and sceptical. Yet, the fact that tension exists now between the North and the South and is, unfortunately on the rise, cannot be denied.

The basic point is very simple. The global military apparatus which has consumed extensive economic and human resources to produce military hardware for so long cannot, and will not, accept a collapse. Its desire is only to grow and grow further. It is not easy, however, to justify this any more, unless new security threats may quickly be defined and magnified. The developing world, and specific countries or groups of countries among them, should pose then as the new targets.

In the same vein, non-proliferation becomes a viable objective instead of the elimination of various classes of weapons. Continuous warnings are hence spread that the threat is no longer where weapons of mass destruction are piled up but where, allegedly, there are intentions to enter into this domain. It is in this context that COCOM is resolved while export control regimes proliferate. Technology is brought under control and access for developing countries is denied.

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This doctrine cannot last and cannot succeed. It may entail some short-term advantages for its promoters but, in the long run, it will turn itself into a new and threatening danger. This is a policy that breeds tension from within, aggravates imbalances and raises hostility.

What we need today is a new doctrine to replace the theories based on "deterrence" and "balance of power" that have persistently contributed to the expansion of the arms race. The new doctrine should concentrate on defensive capabilities: a "defensive security scheme" that bases itself on security and military strength at the lowest level of armaments. Arms that enhance the capacity for sudden aggressive strikes and extensive military offensives must be gradually eliminated through confidence-building among States in various regions.

Disarmament and arms control are the cornerstones of this scheme. The destruction of weapons of mass destruction is the absolute priority as they represent, without a shadow of doubt, the most threatening and destabilizing types of weapons. The elimination of nuclear weapons amongst them is of course the most pressing objective.

As long as nuclear weapons persist, the world will not be immune from the threat of nuclear war. In the 1950s and 1960s, there was an increase in the nuclear club from one to five while in the last two decades new States have come into the limelight as the threshold States. Nuclear weapons have increasingly turned into political weapons and, in the context of deterrence and balance of power, their significance has grown. As a result, despite the ending of the cold war, there is no move towards the elimination of this demonic weaponry.

Nuclear disarmament will therefore be the focus of our work when we attempt to review the non-proliferation Treaty next year. This is a treaty of very limited scope, whose restrictive objective could have perhaps been justified at the peak of the cold war. But today, we must admit sincerely that it is an outdated treaty particularly in the absence of a clear commitment to nuclear disarmament. The notion, promoted chiefly by the nuclear-weapon States, that the Treaty should be extended unconditionally and indefinitely is therefore inconceivable. This would be tantamount to submitting to the continued existence of nuclear weapons for ever. The NPT can thus only have meaning if it is coupled with a time-bound framework and a target date for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The review Conference provides also an important opportunity to assess the progress made in the implementation of commitments by the nuclear-weapon States. High on the agenda would be the status of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and, of course, the level of availability of material, technology and know-how related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy for NPT members and the elimination of existing restrictions in this regard.

We shall, at the same time, examine the prospects for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. While negotiations seem to evolve steadily towards a

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treaty, it is important that the pace be maintained so that the CTBT will be concluded by the time of the NPT review.

Possibilities for non-member threshold States to join the NPT need also to be explored. The situation of Israel and its refusal to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards is of paramount importance in this respect, as its ambitious nuclear programme constitutes a major threat to the countries in the Middle East.

The review, originally planned for one month, may be extended for as long as necessary in order to ensure that sufficient progress in the areas I mentioned has been reached. Only then can we consider fixed periods of extension, as stipulated in the Treaty, which will provide for intermittent reviews at the end of each period. This way we shall also be able to avoid the need for amending the procedure, although amendments for improving the context of the Treaty should by no means be ruled out.

In the realm of chemical weapons, the situation is more promising. Here, for the first time, we have a Convention which attempts to verifiably eradicate a whole class of weapons. The Conference on Disarmament can truly take pride in having successfully concluded the chemical weapons Convention. With its unique features, it has the potential to serve as a model for other disarmament treaties, particularly for weapons of mass destruction. To this end, it is highly important to make certain that it will also succeed in the implementation phase.

The preparatory work at The Hague, which has otherwise moved forward smoothly, has been marred by difficulties in arriving at solutions on some significant and contentious issues. In fact, most questions which were resolved politically during the negotiations have faced contradictory interpretations and positions. As expectations mount for the entry into force of the Convention, efforts need to intensify to ensure the finalization of the preparatory work in 1995.

The CWC, once in effect, should serve as the only basis for dealing with all aspects of chemical disarmament, repudiating any unilateral interpretations in this regard. The debate in the last General Assembly, followed by apparent deadlock in the discussions at The Hague on the question of peaceful use, is raising scepticism and concern. The Convention stipulates that export restrictions may only be applied to non-members. All existing export control regimes, therefore, are expected to be lifted for all members of the CWC without exception upon entry into force.

The same is true of the biological weapons Convention. The current discussions on establishment of a verification system are bound to succeed if they are coupled with a firm commitment to the free flow of material and technology for peaceful use; an undertaking with direct impact on the development of the developing countries in the field of health.

Let me reiterate firmly that the litmus test for the success of the NPT, the CWC and the BWC lies in the attitude of the advanced countries towards

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peaceful use. Needless to say, Iran strongly opposes any non-peaceful application of science and technology, including non-peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Another area of concern in the context of defensive security is the offensive feature of advanced conventional weapons. Accordingly, conventional arms limitations will have to be agreed to as part of a more general strategy to promote defensive security.

On transparency in armaments, a re-emerging old issue which dates back to the days of the League of Nations, the initial momentum on the expansion of the Register has gradually given way to some stubborn inertia.

Today's Register is much more restrictive than the original one. We are still debating the inclusion of military holdings and military forces whereas in 1920 not only were they included but there were even negotiations on putting a cap on armaments.

If we expect the Register to be effective, then, it should, at least as relates to conventional weapons, be as comprehensive as in 1920. It should also be inclusive of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we must also be able to deal with massive military production, particularly by major producers. Without a move towards lower levels of production, transparency in armaments will continue to stagnate and will not serve the intended objective.

Transparency, none the less, remains a prerequisite for transforming "deterrence" into "defensive security". For both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, elimination and reduction may be possible only if extensive information is made available. This is true not only at the global level but at the regional level as well.

In the Middle East the greatest menace comes from weapons of mass destruction and above all, nuclear weapons. Here, all nuclear facilities must be placed under IAEA safeguards and nuclear programmes must be disclosed. This nuclear transparency should facilitate accession of the remaining States to the chemical weapons Convention and the biological weapons Convention. The Middle East should also move quickly towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone free of other weapons of mass destruction.

In the Persian Gulf, after two devastating wars of aggression, a much deeper therapy is needed. The extent of foreign military presence and the quantity of armaments which pours into this area is second to none.

During the first war, Iraq was assisted in arming itself with all types of weaponry. Huge arms shipments arriving through various ports in the region ended up on Iraqi soil. It took another war and sustained international intervention to trim this huge military arsenal and bring it down to size. Yet the bitter experience of the second aggression has overwhelmed the countries in the Persian Gulf so much that they are now purchasing military hardware at astronomical rates.

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Over $40 billion worth of armaments is flowing into the Arab States in the Persian Gulf. This ranks as highest amongst all arms purchases across the globe. Whereas Iran, after eight years of war, allocates less than 1.5 per cent of its budget to military expenditure - a figure that includes a steady and relaxed programme for gradual replenishment of lost capabilities - others are digging deep into their resources to spend an ever-increasing amount on arms and military build-up.

Outside Powers of course are the principal beneficiaries. Major arms producers continue to show profits despite the demise of the cold war essentially through their arms shipments to the Persian Gulf. They continue to allege other potential threats in order to sustain and elevate their sales. Threat perceptions in the region are, thus, broadly distorted and muddled. The ensuing imbalances are bound to create uncertainties more than to enhance security.

Something must be done to stop this senseless arms race in the region. Neither the region nor any of its individual States will benefit from this. The vast God-given resources of the Persian Gulf States surely have better use than to be wasted in unusable hardware.

The concept of defensive security is best applicable and most fitting to the Persian Gulf. It can offer a different approach to security and contribute, solemnly, to the long-term security and stability of the region. This requires, as a first step, the establishment of a forum where threat perceptions and security concerns may be aired openly and ways to improve confidence examined.

There are many possible measures that may be contemplated in order to enhance collective security and reduce tensions. As regards weapons of mass destruction, measures may include, first a renewed commitment to renounce nuclear weapons and reject their acquisition along with regional provisions to ensure compliance; second, joining of the NPT by the States that have not yet done so, and coordinated regional implementation of IAEA safeguards alongside cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy; third, a harmonized approach to the ratification and implementation of the chemical weapons Convention; fourth, formulation of complementary regional verification mechanisms for the biological weapons Convention; and fifth, preparations for establishment of the Persian Gulf as a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

With respect to conventional weapons, on the other hand, it is both possible and feasible to consider, first, transparency in conventional arms and exchanges of reports on military holdings within the region; second, reductions in defensive spending and in purchases of arms, and consideration of a ceiling on arms imports; third, channelling the defence savings to regional development projects; fourth, negotiations towards security schemes on the basis of assured defensive capabilities with minimum quantities of armaments; and fifth, devising security arrangements for the Persian Gulf through regional cooperation.

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The United Nations may play an active role, as mandated by Security Council resolution 598, to initiate and pursue this regional scheme. The Persian Gulf, I am confident, can become as secure as it is prosperous with a genuine political will on the part of the littoral States to move towards cooperation instead of wasteful confrontation. The major difficulty is in setting off the process, not in the process itself. Scepticism must begin to give way to confidence in order to achieve real stability in this region.

At the global level I reiterate, once again, that we need to move fast in order not to allow the emerging cooperation and harmony to precipitate into confrontation and disarray. The next millennium is right on our doorstep. We betray not only our own generation but generations to come, and indeed all humanity, if we do not seize this opportune moment to bring about a safer and more secure world.

The awesome menace of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction must be done away with, and we should, at long last, be able to reverse the spiralling trend in arms production and devote the depleting resources of our planet to what benefits the human being rather than destroys him.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Minister Velayati for his statement and also for the kind words addressed to the Chair. And now the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Hakuo Yanagisawa, is invited to take the floor to make his statement.

Mr. YANAGISAWA (Japan): Let me, first, offer you my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this important time, when the Conference is about to conclude its work of the 1994 session. I should like, also, to avail myself of this opportunity to pay tribute to Mr. Petrovsky, the Secretary-General, and Mr. Bensmail, the Deputy Secretary-General, for so ably heading a secretariat that is doing such very intensive and useful work for this year's Conference session.

I feel honoured to address the Conference - which the Japanese Foreign Ministers, Mr. Shintaro Abe and Dr. Taro Nakayama, addressed in 1984 and 1991, respectively - at this time, when the Conference is engaged in such an intensive and important discussion of disarmament issues in the post-cold war era, in particular a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT), a task of the most historic significance. It gives me very great pleasure to convey to the Conference the best wishes for success in its endeavours of Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, both of whom stressed to me the importance of stressing to the Conference the disarmament policy of the Government of Japan and the interest in and desire for disarmament of the Japanese people.

Forty-nine years have passed since the Second World War ended. World War II brought terrible suffering and tragedy to a great number of people throughout the world. Because of this, after the war, motivated by profound

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and sincere regret for the past, Japan, desiring to ensure that the tragedy of war should never happen again, determined never again to make war, and adopted its peace Constitution. Ever since, Japan has both limited its self-defence forces to a minimum and striven to promote world disarmament. Also, Japan, the only country to have been the victim of nuclear attack, has strictly adhered to its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not manufacturing, and not introducing into Japanese territory nuclear weapons, and has sought to convince the international community of the need to promote disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, with the goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

The end of the cold war has drastically reduced the possibility of a world-scale war, but the danger of the outbreak or spread of regional conflicts arising out of ethnic, tribal or religious hostility has grown, as has the danger of the proliferation and transfer of weapons, including those of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. Given these facts, the international community needs to address the issue of the non-proliferation of such weapons as a task of the highest priority. The question of nuclear weapons development by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and other issues relating to the transfer and proliferation of nuclear weapons which have emerged in the post-cold war era, are extremely serious, and the need to maintain and strengthen the non-proliferation regime, whose central pillar is the NPT, is felt more acutely than ever. Japan once again strongly urges countries not yet parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date. Japan strongly supports the indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 NPT extension conference.

We must strive to attain non-proliferation. We should, also, in no way relax our efforts for nuclear disarmament, given the fact that there still exist nuclear weapons enough to destroy all the world and human civilization. Japan, which desires to see the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, welcomes the START agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation and hopes that they will be implemented soon. In addition, Japan welcomes especially the fact that negotiations on a CTBT are being intensively conducted in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan considers extremely valuable the moratoria on nuclear testing announced by the United States, the Russian Federation and France, and the de facto suspension of nuclear testing by the United Kingdom, which together created a favourable environment for the commencement of the CTBT negotiations, and greatly hopes that China will follow suit. This year, remarkable progress has been made on the CTBT negotiations, under the very effective guidance of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and a rolling text, which will be the basis for subsequent negotiations, has been worked out. These developments deserve to be evaluated very highly. The Committee has decided to continue negotiations after the formal conclusion of the 1994 CD session, and Japan hopes that further, and accelerated, progress will be made in those negotiations. Japan ardently desires to see agreement reached on the CTBT, and Ambassador Tanaka and members of his delegation have been instructed to make every possible effort to that end.

(Mr. Yanagisawa, Japan)

Japan has participated actively in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE), for example, sending Dr. Shigeji Suehiro, formerly the Director-General of the Japan Meteorological Agency, Japan's leading authority in the field of seismology, to the GSE meetings from the outset, believing that Japan can make a valuable contribution in the field of verification of a CTBT, especially in seismology, an area extremely relevant to the implementation of the treaty. Japan annually receives about 30 trainees in seismic engineering from developing countries in the training course of the Japan International Cooperation Agency. I am happy to be able to say that some of the experts representing their countries in the GSE today are graduates of that course. Japan is determined to continue to provide various kinds of technical and human resources contributions in that area.

Japan considers it extremely desirable that a satisfactory CTBT be agreed before the NPT extension and review conference in the spring of next year, and ardently hopes that we will at least have made meaningful progress by that time.

Along with the CTBT, Japan attaches great importance to the issue of the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive purposes as a global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measure. The adoption of the "cut-off" resolution by consensus in last year's United Nations General Assembly, supported by all United Nations Members, including all the nuclear-weapon States, was indeed a very important event.

It is truly regrettable that, notwithstanding the consensus reached thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Shannon of Canada, the Special Coordinator on cut-off, to launch negotiations in the CD, there is as yet no agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee, because of the question of its mandate. Although there are very few days left to the end of the 1994 session, Japan continues to hope that we shall see negotiations on cut-off, based on a mandate reflecting the content of the United Nations General Assembly consensus resolution, begin at once.

The issue of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States is one that has been addressed by the Conference for many years. This year, there has been useful discussion of various aspects and possibilities under the chairmanship of Ambassador Baron Guillaume of Belgium. Japan hopes that, as the 1995 NPT extension conference approaches, there will be further progress in the direction of measures acceptable to all countries.

Japan sees with great concern the repeated discoveries in Germany of smuggled weapon-grade nuclear material. Japan desires to promote a close exchange of views with other countries and to cooperate to prevent the smuggling of nuclear material.

The IRA in Northern Ireland is reported to have declared a cease-fire with the British forces. This move would be welcomed. However, conflicts are still taking place in various parts of the world. Tragically, the degree of "militarization" of those conflicts, their scale and intensity, have grown

(Mr. Yanagisawa, Japan)

markedly in recent years. Particularly notable and tragic examples are to be found in Africa, with the vast amounts of small arms that have been introduced into the region making civil wars very much more destructive than they might otherwise be. Japan firmly maintains its "Three principles on arms exports", part of a rigorously enforced policy of strict control of exports of weapons. Japan considers it essential for the peace and stability of the world for the leading arms-producing countries to greatly restrict their exports of weapons in order not to aggravate instability in regions. The building of an international framework of export control covering the transfer of conventional weapons is a task of great urgency for the international community. Japan has consistently worked for the establishment of such a framework and will continue to strive for the early creation of an effective framework.

The implementation of measures for transparency in armaments (TIA) is extremely important as the first step to arms control and disarmament in the area of conventional weapons. Successive prime ministers of Japan have made clear the great importance they attach to TIA. Japan welcomes the very promising response to the United Nations arms Register, established in 1992 as a result of a joint initiative by Japan and the EC, with more than 80 countries currently participating. Japan hopes that the Register's coverage will be steadily expanded and its effectiveness will continue to grow.

I should, next, like to refer to the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok in July. That meeting of the ARF was of historic significance, establishing a framework for political and security dialogue covering the whole Asia-Pacific region. We find that good start extremely encouraging. Foreign Minister Kono, who represented Japan at the meeting, stressed the importance of disarmament, and advocated "information sharing" measures to enhance the transparency of the defence policies of the countries in the region as part of "mutual reassurance measures". The Chairman's Statement issued at the end of the meeting states that it had been agreed to promote the eventual participation of all ARF countries in the United Nations Register. These developments in the ARF are to be welcomed as an important step for confidence-building in this region.

Japan believes that we should both continue deliberations on TIA in the CD and promote the development of such regional frameworks.

Japan has since 1989 been host to a United Nations disarmament conference six times: three times in Kyoto, twice in Hiroshima and once in Sendai. Senior government officials from many countries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, several of the ambassadors present here, representatives of NGOs and many other people from both Japan and other countries participated in those conferences, at which there were very useful discussions. Japan believes that those conferences provided a valuable stimulus in the deliberations on arms control and disarmament issues in both the CD and the United Nations. Next year, which coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, Japan will host another United Nations disarmament conference, in Nagasaki.

(Mr. Yanagisawa, Japan)

In conclusion, Japan ardently hopes that, pooling and making fruitful the wisdom and experience of humanity, the CD will continue to contribute to the well-being of our children in the twenty first century. I can assure the Conference that Japan will continue to make every possible effort for the promotion of arms control and disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Parliamentary Vice-Minister Yanagisawa for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Ramaker.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): As this year's session draws to a close, may I first wish you every success in guiding us through the last stretches of our work - and as it is the first time that I address this Conference, may I also express my pleasure at seeing the secretariat of this Conference being headed by our Secretary-General, Mr. Petrovsky, and his Deputy, Mr. Bensmail. I know from experience how valuable the assistance of the secretariat is for our work. Allow me finally, Mr. President, through you, to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Brotodiningrat, for the way he fulfilled his duties as President. I am particularly grateful to him for the kind words of welcome he addressed to me when I took up my new assignment as head of the Netherlands permanent representation to this Conference last July.

Eight years have passed since I left Geneva as deputy head of the Netherlands delegation to the Conference on Disarmament and headed for New York. In these years the international climate in which the Conference on Disarmament is functioning has profoundly changed. Since my return I noted a new mood, a new sense of purpose in a CD reinvigorated by a successful outcome of a long and highly complicated negotiating process to ban an entire category of weapons, chemical weapons. Since then the CD has set itself new tasks. I am impressed by the progress made in a relatively short time in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Earlier in this year's session my predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, outlined the Netherlands' views and policies on arms control and disarmament in general. Therefore I do not need to dwell on this now. Neither is there a need for me to elaborate at this juncture on the importance the Netherlands attaches to the only item on our agenda, transparency in armaments, under which attention is given to matters of conventional armament. My predecessor, not too long ago, outlined the Netherlands' position on this issue. Let me just say this. With the end of the cold war the danger of nuclear confrontation, so often invoked in this hall over the years, has receded considerably. But, notwithstanding the profound changes in international relations - and some would say precisely because of that - regional conflicts and wars fought with conventional weapons seem to be on the increase. The Netherlands for one could not accept that the Conference would not address the global aspects of conventional disarmament. Some balance between nuclear and conventional issues in our work must be maintained. Not for the sake of balance itself, but, if not as a moral imperative, then in any case as a link of our work with the harsh realities outside the conference rooms of the Palais.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

Having said that, I do not of course wish to diminish in any way the importance and - yes - the urgency of addressing nuclear issues. There is no denying anyway that at present the bulk of our work is nuclear or nuclear-related in nature. In today's intervention, therefore, I wish to focus on issues of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

The stalemate between East and West that also paralysed the work of this body for so long disappeared by the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. Security doctrines have become truly defensive now on both sides. The role of nuclear weapons in defence concepts is substantially diminishing. At the same time, tremendous progress has been made in nuclear disarmament. The complete elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons - in the intermediate range - is already a few years behind us. Russia and the United States have reached agreement on the kind of deep cuts in their strategic nuclear arsenals the international community has asked for for so long.

With the new international climate now prevailing, conditions have never been more propitious for making rapid progress also on the nuclear issues this Conference is working on. First and foremost in my mind are the strenuous efforts aimed at the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). These negotiations too, take place against a propitious background: four of the five recognized nuclear-weapon States observe declared or de facto moratoria on their underground nuclear testing. The Netherlands hopes sincerely that these moratoria can be maintained until they, so to say, "evaporate" at the moment a treaty enters into force that will ban nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time.

Under the experienced guidance of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has now entered into a true negotiating mode. My delegation is particularly pleased with the serious and hard work carried out in the two working groups on verification and legal and institutional issues. A rolling text with important elements for the future CTBT will be included in this year's report of the CD to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This is, as a working method, an essential step in the negotiating process. My delegation fully supports the idea of continuing our work during the period between the end of this session and the beginning of the 1995 session of the CD. The extensive groundwork done thus far will no doubt quickly result in more treaty text after further inter-sessional negotiations of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban later in the year.

Although optimistic, therefore, on the negotiating process, my delegation is of the opinion that the time has now come to thoroughly address a number of fundamental issues involved in negotiating a test ban. Not all provisions of the future treaty can be dealt with any more only on their own merits. Many of the provisions are clearly interrelated. Unless and until at least a considerable degree of consensus is reached on fundamental issues such as the scope of the ban, the organization and the functions and competences of its organs, entry into force and, last but not least, the size, structure and institutional/legal set-up of the international monitoring system, progress liable to be made on other parts of the treaty will turn out to be limited.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

In the view of the Netherlands, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for explosive purposes would mean another breakthrough in nuclear arms control. My delegation therefore attaches considerable importance to the earliest possible beginning of the negotiation of such a treaty on the basis of a generally acceptable mandate. It is therefore to be noted with regret that a few delegations only still seem to be unable to agree to a negotiating mandate formulated in general terms for an ad hoc committee on cut-off. This is the more regrettable as the text as proposed originally follows closely the wording of last year's United Nations General Assembly resolution on the issue which was, after all, adopted by consensus.

As Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yanagisawa of Japan said a few minutes ago, we hope sincerely that Ambassador Shannon's efforts to reach agreement will be crowned with success in the final days of this year's session.

I would be remiss if, while reviewing our work on nuclear issues, I did not mention an issue which has been with us for so many years. I am referring to the question of negative security assurances. Also here, we have noted some positive developments recently. Since the adoption by the Russian Federation of a new military doctrine last year, four of the five recognized nuclear-weapon States - who happen also to be the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - have given unilateral negative security assurances which, materially speaking, seem to cover the same ground. In all four cases security assurances are extended to non-nuclear-weapon States adhering to the NPT or to a comparable internationally binding agreement. The five permanent members are engaged in serious efforts to bridge the remaining differences between them and reach a common position. The Netherlands would hope that this can be done in the near future. With China's adherence to the NPT the possibility of a common position of the five nuclear-weapon States can only have increased. But pending agreement between the permanent five it seems to us their existing assurances have lost none of their force.

Meanwhile, under the two-track approach decided by the Conference, the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances has continued its work on this issue. Under the inspired leadership of Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium, the Ad Hoc Committee has sharpened its focus on the changed international circumstances under which we are nowadays addressing this issue. Non-proliferation concerns fully justify a conditionality of negative security assurances. On the other hand, the Ad Hoc Committee has also given attention to the concerns of those who advocate a stronger legal underpinning and harmonization of the existing unilateral negative security assurances. Clearly no consensus yet exists on how to merge the different views, but discussions should continue in order to take advantage of the emerging momentum.

As may be clear from what I have said thus far, my delegation's assessment of recent developments in the field of nuclear arms control is an overall positive one. Turning now to nuclear non-proliferation, my delegation is inclined to remain, generally speaking, positive. Of late the existing

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

nuclear non-proliferation climate, so to say, has been bolstered considerably. First, the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has seen increased adherence. Since a few years ago all five nuclear-weapon States have been party to the NPT. Of the three former republics of the Soviet Union, now independent States, on whose territories nuclear-weapon systems had been placed, two, Belarus and Kazakhstan, have in the meantime become parties to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. Hopefully the third, Ukraine, will follow soon. Other newly independent States have become parties to the Treaty as well: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. The three Baltic States also have become parties to the Treaty.

In Africa, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have joined in recent years. Algeria has voiced its intention to do likewise. And, talking about Africa, I wish to signal the substantial progress being made towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

Elsewhere, in Latin America, the regime created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco was considerably strengthened with the accession of Argentina and Brazil. Argentina is also in the process of ratifying the NPT. In the Middle East, finally, an area of crisis with potential nuclear ramifications, the overall political climate has changed for the better considerably.

All of this should bode well for a successful outcome of the 1995 Conference on the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

But nuclear non-proliferation, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, should not be taken for granted. Risks of nuclear proliferation remain with us. Recent reports of leakage even of weapons-grade nuclear materials and nuclear expertise should give us cause for great concern. If nothing else, the recent crisis around the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has shown the world the paramount importance of keeping the existing IAEA safeguards regime under constant review, and strengthening it whenever the need arises, if only because of new technologies.

Next spring, the parties to the NPT will have to take a decision on the extension of the Treaty. It is a momentous decision. The Treaty itself provides us essentially with two options: either an indefinite extension or an extension "for an additional fixed period or periods". The first option would result in a crystal-clear situation, which would enable the present process of nuclear arms control and disarmament to continue while further development of the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes would be assured. The second option, however, extension for an additional fixed period or periods, would involve all kinds of legal complications. It could easily result in a weakening of the NPT and could cast doubt among would-be proliferators as to the determination of NPT States parties to maintain the Treaty as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

I do not need to elaborate on the essential role a viable nuclear non-proliferation regime has to play in establishing a safer and more stable world. It has often been said that nuclear technology, and therefore nuclear weapons, cannot be disinvented. Even in a nuclear-weapon-free world, if such a world can ever be attained, the need for such a regime will still be very strong. For that reason alone the Netherlands will stand firmly for an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT next year, when the parties to that Treaty will have to take a decision on its future.

The Netherlands understands the view that one cannot reach a conclusion on the extension of the Treaty before one has thoroughly examined the operation of the Treaty. Apart from the extension decision, the 1995 Conference indeed has to deal with the review of compliance with the Treaty over the last five years. In reviewing the NPT we should guard, however, against too narrow, too legalistic, an approach. The NPT should also be seen in historical perspective. In our view the Treaty has worked well. It has laid a solid foundation for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. At the time of its conclusion it was generally feared that in a generation the world would be confronted with some tens of nuclear-weapon States. Now, a generation later, this fear has not materialized, and this is to a large degree to the credit of the NPT. With recent adherences, the total number of parties to the Treaty has reached an all-time high. An overwhelming majority of States seem, admittedly in a number of cases on balance, to see clearly the important contribution the NPT makes to stability and security for them all. No State party on the other hand seems to be of the opposite opinion, that its security interests would be better served without the legal framework of a non-proliferation regime as provided by the NPT.

The Netherlands is of course fully aware that the Treaty is not without controversy. It clearly sees the concerns of those who maintain that over the years the NPT has emphasized the cause of horizontal non-proliferation to the detriment of attention to what is called vertical proliferation. We agree that the one cannot be seen in isolation from the other. But the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is a worthy one in itself, and, as I indicated earlier, significant progress has been made in capping and reducing vertical proliferation. Much work, certainly, remains to be done in order to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the world's security architecture. This Conference is making its own contribution to this end by negotiating a CTBT. Hopefully before long a ban on the production of fissile material will follow. While horizontal proliferation remains a cause of concern and therefore of constant vigilance, the prevention, yes the redressing, of what has come to be known as vertical proliferation is on the right track. For the first time in the nuclear era, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation go hand in hand.

It is in this spirit that the Netherlands approaches the remaining preparatory stages of the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, and for that matter, the conference itself.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Ramaker, for his statement and also for the kind words addressed to

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the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Norberg, who will speak in his capacity as Special Coordinator on the review of the agenda for the Conference.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Allow me first, Mr. President, to extend to you my congratulations upon your assumption of the presidency of this Conference.

I have the honour to report today on the result of my consultations as Special Coordinator on the issue of the review of the agenda of the Conference. Let me at the outset stress that the impressions I will now present are solely my own and are not in any way binding on delegations.

Following my appointment, I initially conducted some preliminary and limited bilateral consultations. Thereafter, two rounds of informal open-ended consultations were held under my chairmanship, on 28 June and 11 August respectively. At these consultations all member States and non-member States of the Conference had the opportunity to express their views.

In the course of these discussions, the "Decalogue", the CD's agenda proper and the practice of presidential statements dealing with the agenda have been addressed. Two time perspectives on the issue have in principle presented themselves: on the one hand, the more immediate future; on the other hand, the period post-CTBT and possible "cut-off" negotiations.

The consultations have revealed an openness in general on the part of the delegations to discuss the issue of the agenda. It has also become clear that delegations are prepared to discuss it separately from the question of the composition of the Conference. However, as regards the substance, strong divergent views have been registered with respect to the possible content of a reformed agenda of the Conference.

As regards the "Decalogue", different perceptions as to its relevance and status in relation to the CD have been expressed. However, there seems to be a prevailing view that any changes therein would have to be the subject of deliberations and approval by the United Nations General Assembly.

The discussions relating to CD's agenda proper have covered various aspects such as the existing items on the agenda, possible new items, regrouping of existing items and addition of new ones; also the scope of activities of the Conference were discussed. In this context, divergent positions have been expressed with regard to existing agenda items 2, 3, 7 and 8 respectively. On a more general note, consultations have revealed conflicting views among delegations as to the appropriate balance between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons on the agenda. Divergent views have also been expressed with regard to the question of a possible widening of the CD's scope of activities to include the negotiation of politically binding agreements covering, for example, global confidence-building measures or regional questions.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

The consultations have indicated that consensus on the substantive aspects might not be easily obtained. However, I am gratified to report that there is general agreement on the need to continue the consultations on the review of the agenda during the next annual session of the Conference. Delegations will find before them the text on the issue to be inserted in the report of the CD, as agreed upon at the informal plenary meeting last week.

During the consultations the importance of dealing with the issue of the agenda in a pragmatic way has been underlined by delegations. I believe this is a correct view. By adopting a pragmatic approach to the question, the Conference should be in a position to make progress in the work ahead and effectively respond to the challenges facing it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Norberg for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the informal open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I have the honour to present the report on the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, circulated as document CD/WP.457.

As in previous years, a constructive debate has taken place on the different issues identified for consideration. I am happy to report that agreement has emerged once again, in two important areas.

The first relates to the desirability of amending rule 12 of the rules of procedure in order to enable the functions of the presidency to pass at the beginning of each calendar year to the representative of the member State assuming the presidency next in order of rotation.

The second relates to the subject of computerization and computer coordination between the United Nations Disarmament Affairs Information System in New York, the optical disk system in Geneva, and the Centre for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva. Given the importance that members of the Conference on Disarmament attach to improved and easy access to the information contained in this system, it has been suggested that the necessary installations should be completed within a specific and early time-frame, and that a system of structured periodic consultations be instituted in this field between the member States of the Conference on Disarmament and the Centre for Disarmament Affairs.

Our common endeavour of constant self-examination and self-improvement has once again proved its utility by making tangible recommendations. The desire of member States to continue these open-ended consultations again next year is evidence of the importance that they attach to this exercise.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Kamal for the presentation of his report to the Conference. In conformity with past practice, I intend to

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invite the Conference to take note of that report, as contained in document CD/WP.457, after we have finished with the list of speakers.

I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Mr. Jaguaribe.

Mr. JAGUARIBE (Brazil): The head of my delegation having been called from Geneva on official business, I have been instructed to make the following statement.

I would like to begin, Mr. President, by expressing my delegation's warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and its satisfaction with the efficient manner in which you have conducted our business. I would also like to put on record our appreciation to distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Soemadi Brotodiningrat of Indonesia, for showing us his well-known proficiency and skills in directing our work during his term as President of the CD.

We are arriving at the conclusion of our scheduled session, though we will still meet inter-sessionally in a hopefully productive period to continue to elaborate the future CTBT. We believe the overall balance of this year's work is positive in spite of shortcomings in the work of some committees and of our persistent inability to reach an agreement on the expansion of the membership of the CD, a fact that is doubly distressing to my delegation.

We have this favourable assessment because in its work on the CTBT, the CD has again made evident its ability to progress on relevant matters when there is political commitment. We have to maintain our momentum and to ensure that this commitment is not effaced when we enter the final stages of our negotiation.

I would like to briefly touch upon some of the main issues we have considered this year. The CTBT has been the object of previous interventions of my delegation in the plenary. I do not want to repeat our positions, but I would like to emphasize some points of a general nature which have increasingly attracted our attention.

The CTBT has to be an equitable and non-discriminatory treaty. This basic assumption has to permeate all levels of negotiation, from the basic undertaking to the verification regime. We have repeatedly emphasized that the CTBT is first and foremost a political instrument, wherein the essential value lies in the commitment of States parties. Verification is important, inasmuch as it strengthens the confidence generated by the regime. We are prepared to consider, as we have been doing throughout the negotiations, all proposals made for the verification regime, including those that determine a higher level of verification requirements than we consider necessary.

If we are to have a sophisticated verification regime, we must be assured that it can provide a solid basis for subsequent technical assessment of the nature of the events it detects. If no technical answers can be provided, then we are faced with essentially political decisions and the whole

(Mr. Jaquaribe, Brazil)

verification apparatus to be set in place serves little purpose. If technical answers can be provided, then the organization must have all the required expertise to carry out these functions, without detriment to the right of States parties to maintain their own national capacity. I am sure all delegations can perceive the difficulties that would be posed by the need to rely solely on countries that have an established capacity in this area for the technical assessment of events, due to the inability of the secretariat to provide it. I can here recall, perhaps slightly out of context, an observation that is generally made in relation to matters such as these: the socialization of costs and the privatization of benefits. In short, the question that comes to mind is the following: if events can be technically assessed by individual States parties, why does it seem difficult to have the secretariat have this capability?

We believe that the logical consequence of this is the need to have ample analytical capability in the secretariat. This does not mean that we want the secretariat to have a political decision-making role, which has to remain the exclusive domain of the States parties, through the appropriate deliberative bodies of the organization. This political decision, however, must be based on the fullest level of technical evaluation possible, and States parties should be able to rely on the secretariat for that.

We believe, as we have previously stated, that this will imply the need for agreed criteria, not exclusively of a technical nature, to be provided to the secretariat related to the assessment of data received. The technical criteria to be developed would consist, among other things, of a harmonization of the methods presently utilized to assess data and any refinements which a consolidated and integrated verification regime such as the one envisaged would allow. This process would have to be undertaken by a preparatory committee, but we envisage its continuity under the supervision of the Executive Council. The criteria of a non-technical nature would have to be non-discriminatory and based on technical assumptions. They would be set by the intergovernmental bodies of the organization, to help the secretariat in sorting the data obtained.

These measures could be adopted without hindrance to the right of any interested State party to proceed to its own evaluation and to submit results and proposals derived therefrom to the intergovernmental bodies of the organization.

Despite the persistent and creative efforts of its Chairman, Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium, the Committee on negative security assurances was again unable to make significant progress, though some innovative ideas were discussed. Brazil believes that the only truly effective assurance against nuclear weapons is their complete elimination under international supervision. However, there can be no issue taken with the legitimacy of the demands of non-nuclear-weapon States to receive negative security assurances. Their claims are a logical consequence of their abdication of the nuclear-weapon course. Though we are not members of the NPT, we share the view of those that maintain that negative security assurances should find a place in that Treaty as they have in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Indeed, it

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would be logical to suppose that a legally binding verifiable commitment to horizontal non-proliferation, in whatever form it is undertaken, should have as an automatic and unconditional effect that of obtaining legally binding negative security assurances. The fact that these assurances are denied gives rise for concern, not so much on account of the effective value of the assurances, but because of the political significance of the perception of the lack of will of the nuclear Powers to provide them.

We don't want to overemphasize the relevance of negative security assurances, however, because of our firm belief that the question of nuclear weapons requires other and more incisive initiatives. In fact, we believe we must avoid creating the understanding that obtaining negative security assurances would level the playing field once again and remove the factual and conceptual difficulties related to the existence of nuclear weapons in a few countries.

The Committee on Transparency in Armaments proved to be one of the most controversial items of our agenda this year. Brazil favours the Register of the United Nations and has been providing information on all its aspects, including procurement through national production and military holdings, in a detailed and disaggregated form. We believe our considerations should address all the issues that are perceived as problematic by interested parties. Our major concern should remain to attain universality in the response. Some sustain the concept that since our first aim is universality, we should not make any changes in the Register until we have approached that goal. We believe this to be essentially contradictory, because the Register is not attaining universality largely on account of its flaws or perceived flaws. Therefore, more than an optional exercise, and to some a diverting one, the review of the Register becomes a requirement for reaching universality.

In order to reach universality we must strive to avoid inequitable or discriminatory approaches. The inclusion of weapons of mass destruction and a more comprehensive and detailed system of categorization would evidently constitute an extremely relevant contribution in this regard. We are concerned with the continued resistance of some countries to allow for a more meaningful categorization of the Register or a greater breakdown of the information. It also seems to be totally contradictory to be talking about excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms and not to include weapons of mass destruction in the Register. This would not divert it from its original intent, but make it more equitable and acceptable for many of those that presently have difficulties.

We would like to reiterate our belief that the Register can and does provide tangible benefits and its maintenance and improvement should be pursued. Its flaws or perceived flaws should be negotiated and not give rise to outright rejection.

Perhaps in no other field has the end of the cold war era created a more favourable environment for positive steps as in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. If an arms race in outer space is no longer taking place, as suggested by some delegations during our discussions this year within the

(Mr. Jaquaribe, Brazil)

Ad Hoc Committee, then it would seem logical that the past impediments to concrete measures are also no longer sustainable. We believe that the international political situation is now propitious for an objective effort in the direction of the banning of all types of space weapons, so as to assure the peaceful use of outer space in the interest and benefit of mankind. As to the question of how the Ad Hoc Committee should proceed, we have no reasons to oppose non-discriminatory confidence-building and transparency measures as long as they preserve the right of every State to access space technology for peaceful purposes and to the benefits of peaceful outer space exploration. However, due to their limited and partial nature, CBMs are clearly insufficient to achieve the ultimate objective of disarmament in outer space. The Committee therefore should look even further in order to achieve a universal, comprehensive, legally binding, multilateral and effectively verifiable instrument banning the arms race in outer space. My Government has concluded the rearrangement of the organs involved in outer space activities in Brazil and consolidated them under the coordination of the recently established Brazilian Space Agency (AEB), of civilian nature, under the direct authority of the Presidency of the Republic, to coordinate national space activities, thus reaffirming our commitment to the peaceful use of outer space.

We are all indebted to Ambassador Shannon of Canada for his continuous efforts to allow for the institutionalized negotiation of a treaty dealing with fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We firmly believe that the future treaty should effectively deal with existing stockpiles if it is to have the necessary impact. Without diminishing the relevance of a prohibition of future production, we believe that, at present, it is the existence of large quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium and possible uncertainties about its control that pose the greatest proliferation risks both horizontally and vertically. We understand that there are differing views in this area and we are prepared to discuss the issue within an ad hoc committee. It seems to us that trying to define the scope of the future agreement through the mandate of the committee, when there are known differences of opinion, is tantamount to rejecting negotiation. We are hopeful that the obvious relevance of this matter for the disarmament and non-proliferation framework would lead delegations to a more flexible position.

We are again confronted with a situation where we reach the final stages of our deliberations and have not been able to overcome the obstacles to an expansion of the Conference. We are particularly concerned with this situation and want to restate our delegation's position that the composition of the Conference has long ceased to adequately reflect the different realities of today's world. Our composition stems from the cold war era and largely reflects the predominant situation of the time. It is unnecessary to recall that a lack of representativity in the composition of the Conference adversely affects its work. Although this circumstance is attenuated by the fact that observers have been fully able to contribute to our work, the essence of the problem remains and we must continue to strive for an urgent and appropriate solution.

(Mr. Jaquaribe, Brazil)

We are thankful for the enlightened and careful efforts our Special Coordinator on the agenda, Ambassador Norberg of Sweden, has undertaken in carrying out consultations on this important and delicate issue. We believe that the "Decalogue" contains all the necessary elements for the work of the Conference. Nevertheless, we also believe that without abandoning the pursuit of long-established goals, we should also look into less ambitious undertakings that have a more propitious outlook for a successful conclusion and which would gradually lead us to the realization of our basic objectives. We are convinced that the significance of the end of the cold war, beyond the disarmament cliche it has become, has yet to be fully assessed and effectively explored in what relates to the disarmament possibilities it has opened.

Let me conclude by extending our continuous appreciation to Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, our Coordinator for improved and effective functioning, not only for the successful deliberations he has led, but also for the ability of allowing them to be a highly enjoyable exercise.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Before giving the floor to the chairmen of the ad hoc committees to introduce their reports, which are now available in English, I should like to draw your attention to the final paragraphs in the reports of NSA, outer space and TIA which are for the time being bracketed. As you are aware, this issue is under intensive consultations and I am confident that this question will be solved before their adoption next week. I hope that, at our informal plenary meeting later today, I shall be in a position to make a proposal in this regard for your consideration.

With that in mind, I now give the floor to Mrs. Bauta Solés of Cuba, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and who I understand will also make a short statement on behalf of her own delegation.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I should first like to register our delegation's satisfaction at seeing you preside over the Conference on Disarmament at this important stage in its work. Our thanks also go to your predecessor, Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia.

I cannot address the subject of concern to us this morning without voicing our satisfaction at the presence in this room of so many illustrious people and our thanks for the contributions they have made, through their statements, to our work.

I have the honour to introduce to this Conference on behalf of Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, the report of that Committee, distributed as document CD/1271 of 23 August 1994, which relates the work undertaken by the Committee during this year's meetings. In pursuance of the mandate given to the Committee by the Conference, we continued examining and identifying, in

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

substantive debates, relevant aspects of preventing the arms race in outer space. Although the pace of work was slow at times we can feel satisfied at having advanced towards a better understanding of this crucial problem.

It is not my intention in introducing this report to analyse the substance, a task which should be left to the relevant authorities in our respective capitals, although I must point out that the need to improve the existing legal regime and work on confidence-building measures has once again been raised, many delegations identifying this as an avenue to explore with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space.

I would like on this occasion to express my appreciation and gratitude to all delegations for their cooperation, especially the coordinators of the regional groups, China and Sweden and Mr. Vorobiev of the Russian Federation and Professor Natalino Ronzitti of Italy, who as Friends of the Chair provided help on subjects concerning confidence-building measures and legal and terminological issues, respectively. My very special thanks go to the secretariat for its invaluable assistance throughout this session; I would particularly like to thank Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov and Mrs. Dawn Scott, whose constant availability enabled us to conclude our work successfully.

This, then, is the report of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Now, with your permission, Sir, I would like to make a brief statement in my capacity as representative of Cuba.

On 29 August, Cuba announced its decision to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America. It is my delegation's honour to transmit this decision by the Cuban Government to the Conference on Disarmament. The decision by the Cuban Government was announced in a letter to the President of Brazil, His Excellency Mr. Itamar Franco, by Cuba's President, Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz, in recognition of Brazil's interest in the matter and its confidence that the people of Cuba takes its commitments seriously. Cuba also informed the Mexican Foreign Office of its decision, taking account of its similar interest and the fact that Mexico has supported Cuban positions on this. For our Government, the decision is of great significance. It is a gesture on our part out of our desire for peace in the region and as part of our efforts to make a practical contribution to bringing the Latin American peoples closer together and integrating them. The Cuban Government has taken this step whilst the only nuclear Power in our hemisphere is stepping up its economic, commercial and financial blockade policy, reinforcing its campaign against Cuba and maintaining by force, against the will of our people, its illegal occupation of a part of the country through which its vessels, some bearing nuclear weapons, pass.

In future, a solution to this problem must be regarded as a precondition for our remaining a party to the Treaty. In the circumstances, our decision underscores the confidence that Cuba has in the future of Latin America, including the noble objectives of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mrs. Bauta Solés for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, to introduce the report of that Committee.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Allow me, Sir, to offer you the congratulations of the Mexican delegation on the way in which you have been discharging your functions as President of the Conference. I can assure you of my delegation's fullest cooperation. As the representative of the depositary Government of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, I would, through you, like to thank the representative of Cuba and say that we are duly cognizant of the Cuban Government's decision to accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

I shall now introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and I will do so in English - which tells you the language of the original draft.

(continued in English)

It is an honour to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which is contained in document CD/1273. This report was adopted by the Committee on 24 August 1994. As you may recall, the mandate of the Committee directs it to "negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security". In discharging its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee decided to hold a general exchange of views on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Ad Hoc Committee and its two working groups have worked on establishing the elements and elaborating draft language on the legal and institutional aspects as well as the verification regime of the treaty. The Committee decided to include the results of its ongoing negotiations on the draft treaty in the rolling text which is contained in the appendix to the technical part of the report.

Part 1 of the appendix represents the elaboration of provisions of the treaty which command a certain degree of consensus. Part 2 of the appendix contains provisions which need more extensive negotiation. Part 3 comprises a list of documents containing proposals of delegations. The Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that the appendix to the report as well as the documents listed in the report and other relevant documents be used for further negotiations and drafting of the treaty. It further recommends that work continue on the treaty during the period 28 November to 16 December and possibly longer. Lastly, the Committee recommends that it be re-established at the outset of the 1995 session of the Conference on Disarmament with its present mandate.

I should also note that this Ad Hoc Committee report covers the period up to 24 August. As work has continued since then, it will be updated in a

(Mr. Marín Bosch)

revised report to be submitted to the Committee on Monday, 5 September for its consideration and adoption. It will then be introduced to the plenary on 6 September.

Allow me to conclude by offering my sincere appreciation to the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassadors Hoffmann of Germany and Dembinski of Poland, as well as for the work of the Friends of the Chair. Allow me finally to thank the secretariat and, in particular, the Committee Secretary, Ms. Mackby.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marín Bosch for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, who will introduce the report of that Committee.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): To begin with, Sir, I should like to congratulate you, not only on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference, but also on the efficient manner in which you coordinated our work in its last and very decisive phase. At the close of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments I have the honour to introduce its report as contained in document CD/1274. You may see that this Ad Hoc Committee was able to use the time available to it fully. We had 22 regular meetings, but in addition we had a number of informal meetings too. I wish to thank all delegates participating in the Ad Hoc Committee and, in particular, the Group Coordinators as well as China and Sweden for their cooperation. I also wish to thank Mr. Jerzy Zaleski and the secretariat for the efficient assistance continuously given to the Committee.

The report which I have the honour to introduce now reflects the work we have done. It reflects the manifold nature of our subject and the fact that we have dealt with a number of controversial issues. You may see in the report that it is comprehensive and analytical. It is the outcome of the spirit of cooperation and of compromise displayed by all delegations who participated in our discussions. We have in our report a considerable portion devoted to a survey of the substantive work done during this session, which was intended to reflect all important points underlying our discussions. Then in accordance with our mandate, we addressed more specific parts of this large domain, mainly military holdings and procurement through national production, transfer of high technology with military applications and weapons of mass destruction. The last part of our report is devoted to the examination of other related aspects and, among them, you may find new ones too, not only topics which have been dealt with earlier and further elaborated on now, but even new aspects.

I wish to draw your attention to the idea of the code of conduct for international transfers of arms and the necessity to elaborate the aspect of dealing with massive production of sophisticated advanced armaments and also the organizational structure and size of armed forces. Importance was given to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms; the conversion or closure of military production facilities was also considered. Openness and transparency in nuclear matters was addressed with great emphasis, and we

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

discussed regional approaches to be considered in parallel with global approaches to transparency in armaments. We agreed upon this report in full, except for the last paragraph, as already indicated by you, Mr. President. This is now proposed in brackets, because no consensus was reached on the last paragraph concerning recommendations. Otherwise the entire text was adopted ad referendum and is now submitted to the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Boytha for his statement and also for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium, who will introduce the report of that Committee.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): First of all, may I tell you how happy we are at seeing you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament at such a crucial point in its activities? Your professional abilities, your feeling for diplomacy, your adroitness and wisdom are not only recognized features but they are particularly appreciated in this difficult time for the Conference on Disarmament as we draft our reports.

I have the honour to introduce to you today the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, document CD/1275, which was adopted ad referendum by the Ad Hoc Committee on 30 August this year. The report is the fruit of efforts by all the delegates who took part in its work, and I believe it to be an objective reflection of what happened.

This year the Committee adopted a new approach, trying to fit the subject of negative security assurances into a broader context whilst keeping it closer to present-day reality. Thus for a large part of the debate we tried to meet the concerns of some with regard to their countries' interests and to understand the fears of others in the field of both global and regional security. In today's uncertain world, how can we respond to both challenges and threats? We have been looking for the magic formula that could reconcile the two, welcoming the challenges and warding off the threats. In all we had a very rich debate, even if we were not able to arrive at concrete proposals that might have been reflected in the report.

In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to the group coordinators, China and Sweden, who were very helpful in our bureau meetings, and all delegations who were unstinting in their assistance. Their cooperation and the precious assistance provided by the secretariat, in particular Mr. Bogomolov, for whom I have nothing but praise, made it possible for me to present to you the report you now have before you.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Guillaume for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

(The President)

I should like to thank all the chairmen of the ad hoc committees for their reports, and inform you that these reports will be taken up for adoption at the next plenary meeting, on Tuesday, 6 September, at 10 a.m.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Chandra, the representative of India, in order to make his statement.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): At the outset, Mr. President, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that under your customary wise and able guidance and leadership the Conference will continue to function smoothly and effectively in pursuance of its tasks. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia, for his excellent conduct of the proceedings of the Conference. Similarly Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico deserves our sincere thanks for his dynamic leadership of the NTB Committee, as do Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinksi for all their efforts.

I take the floor today primarily to express our views on the future of CTBT. I had occasion to speak on this subject on 2 June 1994, but since then there has been further evolution in our thinking and I would like to make the following comments on some aspects of the proposed CTBT.

The CTBT should be comprehensive: extending to all environments and envisaging no threshold. It should aim for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States for all times. There should be no exceptions for carrying out nuclear tests under any circumstances. We have closely examined the various views expressed on "preparations" to be included in the scope of the treaty. While inclusion of imminent "preparations" is laudable, defining the term is difficult, its verification would also be costly. Accordingly, we feel that "preparations" need not be directly referred to in the article dealing with basic obligations. We favour special monitoring arrangements for established nuclear-weapon test sites and eventually some transparency norms could be negotiated.

I would like to thank all the Friends of the Chair in the Working Group on Verification for their valuable contributions. In particular, Dr. Peter Marshall of the United Kingdom deserves special thanks for his dedication and excellent papers produced by his teams. The options given in the working papers on verification techniques would help us considerably in taking decisions in this regard.

As for the entire CTBT, the verification system should be universal in its application, non-discriminatory and should guarantee equal access to all States. Accordingly, we do not favour the idea that countries that have accepted full-scope safeguards as part of their obligations under the NPT need not accept all aspects of a CTBT verification regime. At present, we believe that a cost-effective combination of seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasonic monitoring techniques would be adequate to verify a CTBT in the lower atmosphere, under water and underground. A nuclear-test explosion in outer space would require the use of EMP sensors, optical flash and

(Mr. Chandra, India)

fluorescent sensors and satellite monitoring. Inclusion of these techniques in a verification regime is, however, questionable as it would provide only marginal utility in terms of assurance while enhancing the cost manifold.

Of the four verification techniques, an international seismic monitoring network is considered by us as the most critical. Besides a seismic station offered for participation in GSETT-3, India also has few radionuclide monitoring stations which may be upgraded. For CTBT verification, radionuclide monitoring would extend to cover short-lived isotopes in particulate form and noble gases - krypton and xenon. We do not share the view expressed by some that radionuclide monitoring be on-line because of the financial implications. Co-location of seismic stations with infrasound arrays should also be considered as a cost-effective measure. This would enable infrasonic data to be provided on-line. Regarding hydroacoustic monitoring, we had suggested a reduction in the number of moored stations by careful examination and by establishing some coastal seismic stations.

The secretariat and the IDC should have the capability to both detect and discriminate between events. Many States do not have the capability to analyse large volumes of data. In our view, for practical purposes, the daily IDC bulletins should be prefaced by an analytical summary. Any anomalous event should be brought to the attention of the Executive Council immediately. Of course, all States would enjoy access to IDC data to derive their own analysis and interpretation. In all cases, the IDC should play an analytical role and not be limited merely to data collection and dissemination.

On-site inspections would be the most intrusive element of the verification regime. This would be a necessary part of the verification regime for deterrence purposes as well. We visualize routine visits only for authentication purposes and an on-site inspection to be a rare event. On-site inspection would have to be approved by the Executive Council after due consideration and in an appropriate time framework, in which provision should be made for obligatory consultation and clarification to clarify the ambiguity.

I would like to thank Mr. Jaguaribe of Brazil, the Friend of the Chair on organization, for his paper WP.154. We have kept our options open on the organization till further negotiations are completed on the various verification techniques. We believe that the structure of an international organization would consist of a conference of States parties, an executive council and a technical secretariat (including the IDC). It is also felt that a scientific advisory group may be constituted to provide independent and relevant inputs to the Executive Council. This would be relevant when the Executive Council is required to take a decision on sensitive issues like for instance review of technological developments.

On entry into force, we would like particularly to thank Ambassador Vattani, the Friend of the Chair, for providing six options. Different views have been expressed for EIF, from a limited requirement of ratification by the five declared nuclear-weapon States to the expanded

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membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Our view has been that while the former is too limited, the latter would unnecessarily delay the EIF of a CTBT. Certain other countries which are key to the success of a universal and non-discriminatory CTBT must be included at the outset. We therefore believe that EIF should be based on ratification by a reasonable and representative group of countries.

The duration of the treaty should in our view be unlimited. Given the possibility of technological developments, it would be necessary to have provisions for a periodic review conference. As in the other international treaties, the decision-making and substantive issues in the Executive Council or the conference of States parties should be on the basis of a two-thirds majority, present and voting.

In regard to the "Preamble" section, we feel that a clear linkage to nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons should be established. Since we are not a signatory to the NPT, any reference to the same would not be acceptable to us. In a larger context, we believe that the norm of non-proliferation and disarmament should be strengthened by a non-use agreement.

We look forward to a work programme for the inter-sessional period closely linked to textual progress in the rolling text with the aim of concluding a CTBT at the earliest possible time.

Turning now to the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices, in keeping with our co-sponsorship of the United Nations General Assembly consensus resolution on "cut-off", we had hoped for the early establishment of an ad hoc committee based on the resolution with a negotiating mandate to negotiate a convention on "cut-off" which should be non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and internationally and effectively verifiable. It is unfortunate that we have not been able to agree to a mandate till now. We sincerely hope that an appropriate mandate based on the United Nations General Assembly resolution will be agreed upon before the end of this CD session. In this respect we would particularly like to thank Ambassador Shannon of Canada, the Special Coordinator on "cut-off", for his tireless efforts.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Chandra for his statement and for his kind words towards the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. TCHOE (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Mr. President, like previous speakers, I wish you every success during your presidency.

I shall be very brief. During the present session, the delegations of Japan and the Netherlands have alluded to my country's nuclear programme and NPT-related matters. I do not wish to challenge their points. My Government

(Mr. Tchoé, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

is aware that some countries have voiced doubts in this regard. To dispel such doubts and settle my country's nuclear problems, my Government is discussing and negotiating with the United States of America, and our hopes are pinned on those negotiations. I should like to stress to this Conference that certain countries with a special interest in the matter should adopt the right attitude to encourage the process and settle my country's nuclear questions instead of pouring cold water on the proceedings - if they really want to settle all the regional security problems on the peninsula. My Government's determination and resolve to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will remain unshaken. This idea, conceived by President Kim Il Song, who died two months ago, will certainly be carried out by our leader, Kim Jong Il. Hence those who would wish to see the nuclear problems solved should encourage efforts devoted to settling them, and the process of evolution of the situation.

The PRESIDENT: Are there any further requests for the floor? I recognize the representative of Brazil, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. JAGUARIBE (Brazil): I take the floor very briefly to announce the satisfaction of my Government with the announcement of the Cuban Government of its intention of ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, of which we were kindly given advance notice.

The PRESIDENT: Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see no further requests for the floor. As I mentioned earlier, I should like to proceed to discuss the report of the Chairman of the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which was circulated as document CD/WP.419. May I take it that, in accordance and in conformity with past practice, the Conference takes note, with appreciation, of that report?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that it be adopted. I see no comments.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before adjourning this meeting, I should like to remind you that this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. the Conference will hold an informal plenary meeting to continue consideration of the technical parts of the draft annual report to the General Assembly and any other substantive paragraphs. I hope that we will be able to conclude this exercise in time to allow for a meeting of Working Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 6 September at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.